The standard analysis of the e¢ cient management of income taxes and debt assumes a benevolent government and ignores potential distortions arising from rent-seeking politicians. This paper departs from this framework by assuming that a rent-seeking politician chooses policies. If the politician chooses extractive policies, citizens throw him out of power. We analyze the e¢ cient sustainable competitive equilibrium. Unlike in the standard economy, temporary economic shocks generate persistent changes in taxes and debt along the equilibrium path. This serves to optimally limit rent-seeking by the politician and to optimally generate support for the politician from the citizens. Policies which do not respond persistently to shocks are very costly since the government over-saves and resources are wasted on rents.
Introduction
"Economists should cease pro¤ering policy advice as if they were employed by a benevolent despot, and they should look to the structure within which political decisions are made." (Buchanan, 1987, p.243) This paper characterizes optimal tax and debt management in the presence of rentseeking politicians. Constraints on politicians are important determinants of economic performance around the world, and it is important for policy prescriptions to consider politicians' rent-seeking incentives. 1 We study the economic environment of Lucas and Stokey (1983) , and instead of assuming the existence of a benevolent government, we introduce an electoral accountability model as originally developed in Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) . We characterize the stochastic time path of taxes and debt, and we highlight why conventional policy prescriptions which do not account for the self-interest of politicians can induce excessive rent-seeking and be socially costly.
We consider a closed economy with no capital, with shocks to the productivity of public spending, and with complete markets. The economy is managed by a rent-seeking politician whose utility increases in rents, which we de…ne as excessive public spending with no social value. While citizens discipline the politician by threatening to remove him from o¢ ce for misbehavior, the policies of the benevolent government cannot be implemented because of limited commitment: a politician cannot commit to policies once in o¢ ce and citizens cannot commit to keeping the incumbent in power in the future. As is well known, departures from the Lucas and Stokey (1983) equilibrium occur even under a benevolent government if (i) contingent debt is unavailable as in Barro (1979) , (ii) default is possible, (iii) there is imperfect information about public spending shocks, or (iv) the government cannot commit to the interest rate. In order to focus our attention on pure rent-seeking distortions, we abstract away from all of these realistic constraints by (i) imposing no limit on …nancial instruments, (ii) abstracting from default, (iii) assuming perfect information, and (iv) …xing the (stochastic) interest rate by assuming quasi-linear preferences. 2 We consider an in…nitely repeated game between citizens and politicians with double sided lack of commitment in which reputation sustains equilibrium policies. We examine e¢ cient sustainable competitive equilibria. If the politician chooses his optimal deviation from equilibrium policies in any given period-by maximizing revenue, minimizing public spending, repaying current debt, and maximizing future debt-then he is punished by replacement. If citizens deviate from equilibrium replacement rules by replacing an incumbent, then the incumbent is maximally extractive prior to leaving o¢ ce. Thus, e¢ cient policies are the solution to the standard problem subject to the addition of two incentive compatibility constraints in every period. We show that this problem has a recursive representation with a single endogenous state variable: the value of the stream of rents plus the value of government debt. If the stream of rents and government debt are too low (high), this violates the politician's (citizens') incentive compatibility constraint. While the tax rate under a benevolent ruler is …xed, in our environment it follows an S; s rule, with state dependent lower and upper bounds associated with the incentive constraints of the politician and the citizens, respectively.
There are three main results in our paper. First, even though markets are complete, taxes adjust persistently to shocks along the equilibrium path, which is in contrast to the policies of Lucas and Stokey (1983) . This is because public spending shocks create variation in the opportunity for politicians to appropriate rents and variation in the need for society to provide incentives to politicians. Optimal incentive provision is intertemporal, and incentives for the politician are provided by the government increasing rents and debt into the future. In general equilibrium, this manifests itself in more persistent tax rates. Thus, the time path of taxes in our economy is qualitatively similar to that generated in the absence of contingent debt, so that the presence of politicians introduces a form of endogenous market incompleteness.
Why is a …xed tax rate as under a benevolent government suboptimal? Because it is associated with excessive savings which induce excessive rent-seeking. As an example, consider an economy with a temporary, perfectly anticipated war which lasts a single period at T . A benevolent government chooses a …xed tax rate along the equilibrium path. Prior to T , the government uses its tax revenue to purchase assets from the private sector; in period T , it borrows from the private sector; and from T onwards, it uses its revenue to …nance the interest on its period T debt which is rolled over forever. Could such a …xed tax rate be optimal under rent-seeking politicians? Imagine if this were the case, and for simplicity, imagine if politicians are paid positive rents in period T . This arrangement and Yeltekin (2006). can be improved if the government reduces period T savings and if it accommodates this change by reducing taxes in period T 1 and rents in period T by equivalent amounts. This strategy is economically feasible and it is incentive compatible, since, even though the politician's value of cooperation is reduced (i.e., period T rents are reduced), so is his value of deviations (i.e., period T savings are reduced).
3 Moreover, citizens'welfare improves since their taxes are lower. More generally, whenever the politician's incentive compatibility constraint is tight, current and future rents can be increased, since this increases the politician's value of cooperation today and in the future. Moreover, current and future debt can be increased since this decreases the politician's value of deviation today and in the future. Both of these changes induce a persistent increase in the tax rate. Likewise, whenever citizens' incentive compatibility constraint is tight (e.g., after the war when the government is less productive), current and future rents and debt can be decreased. Both of these changes induce a persistent decrease in the tax rate. Our second result is that the long run behavior of our economy with endogenously incomplete markets is di¤erent than the long run behavior of an economy with exogenously incomplete markets in which taxes also respond persistently to shocks. Speci…-cally, Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2002) show that in an economy without state-contingent debt, the benevolent government accumulates assets along the equilibrium path, until it can …nance the entire stream of public spending with zero taxes. 4 In our environment, there is no economic motive for the accumulation of assets since state contingent claims are available, and furthermore, the accumulation of assets is not politically sustainable since it ignores the incentives of politicians. To illustrate the long run behavior of our economy, consider the best sustainable equilibrium for the citizens. Along the equilibrium path, the government goes into further debt, and the politician extracts more and more rents. If the incentive compatibility constraint of the citizens never binds, then the tax rate increases and public spending decreases until eventually the incentive compatibility constraint on the politician stops binding. In the long run, the tax rate reaches a maximum and is …xed as in Lucas and Stokey (1983) . In contrast, if the incentive compatibility constraint of the citizens binds, the tax rate can never reach this maximum, and it may respond persistently to shocks even in the long run. Our last result, established through a simple numerical exercise, is that the welfare cost due to politicians is low under the best sustainable policy but high under a subop-timal sustainable policy appropriate to a benevolent ruler. The best sustainable policy maximizes household welfare by imposing endogenous …nancial constraints on the government so as to minimize the value of rents paid to politicians. Since the value of these rents is low, the only additional cost due to politicians operates through endogenous …-nancial constraints which induce volatile and persistent taxes, and this cost is small for similar reasons that the cost of exogenous …nancial constraints has been found to be small in previous research. 5 In contrast, we consider the suboptimal sustainable policy which maximizes household welfare subject to a …xed tax rate and smooth public spending pro…le which are sustainable. This policy-which is qualitatively the same as that under a benevolent ruler-generates sizeable welfare losses since the government over-saves, and in order to induce the politician from not appropriating these savings, citizens allow the politician to divert excess resources away from public spending towards rents. Our exercise suggests that a potential reason that a benevolent ruler's policies are not observed in practice is that these polices are costly once the incentives of politicians are considered.
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This paper makes three contributions. First, it characterizes optimal policies in the presence of rent-seeking politicians. These are also studied in Tsyvinski (2007a,2007b) . The current paper is di¤erent from their work in two important respects. First, it focuses on the dynamics of government debt, which is an essential element of macroeconomic …scal policies and is ruled out in their model. Second, it introduces aggregate shocks which are not present in their work. The optimal …scal policy response to aggregate shocks is studied in the work described in Footnote 2, and we depart from this work by focusing on the role of pure rent-seeking distortions. Second, our paper complements the literature on the political economy of debt by highlighting how the incentives of politicians a¤ect optimal policy prescriptions. More speci…cally, Battaglini and Coate (2007) study the dynamics of taxes and debt in a political economy model, but they focus on the Markov Perfect Equilibrium in an environment with incomplete markets in which competing groups stochastically take power. The distinguishing feature of the current paper is the focus on e¢ cient sustainable policies in an environment with complete markets and with electoral accountability. These di¤erences enable us to obtain di¤erent predictions for the short and long run.
7 Finally, this paper establishes a connection between our model of electoral accountability in general equilibrium under aggregate shocks and related models of consumption risk sharing with double-sided lack 5 Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2002) show that the cost of non-contingent debt is small. 6 The empirical dynamics of taxes are discussed in Bohn (1990) , Kingston (1987) , Huang and Lin (1993) , Marcet and Scott (2003) , Sargent and Velde (1995) . 7 For related work on the political economy of debt, see Aghion and Bolton (1990) , Alesina and Perotti 1994) , Alesina and Tabellini (1990) , Lizzeri (1999) , Persson and Svensson (1989). of commitment (see Alvarez and Jermann, 2001, and Kocherlakota, 1996) . The methods used in this related literature allow us to explicitly characterize the path of policies in our framework.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 de…nes a sustainable competitive equilibrium. Section 4 characterizes the e¢ cient sustainable competitive equilibrium. Section 5 discusses a numerical example. Section 6 extends the model to examine how additional frictions interact with the presence of rent-seeking politicians. Section 7 concludes, and the Appendix contains all of the proofs and additional material.
Model

Economic Environment
The economic environment is identical to that of Lucas and Stokey (1983) with a single modi…cation. The government can …nance rents which are bene…cial to politicians.
Time and Uncertainty
There are discrete time periods t = f0; :::; 1g and a stochastic state s t 2 S f1; :::; N g which follows a …rst order Markov process with full support for N 2 . There are no absorbing states and s 0 is given. Let s t = fs 0 ; :::; s t g 2 S t represent a history, let s k js t represent the probability of s k conditional on s t for k t.
Households
There is a continuum of mass 1 of identical households which derive the following utility from economic activity:
c t is consumption, n t is labor, and g t is government spending. Our model considers a special case of this preference: u (c t ; n t ; g t ; s t ) = c t n t = + (s t ) g t = , for 0 < < 1 < and (s t ) > 0. (s t ) is high (low) when public spending is more (less) productive.
This utility function allows us to abstract away from bond price manipulation by the government-which can potentially cause additional distortions even under a benevolent government-and to explicitly characterize equilibrium dynamics. In Section 6, we argue that the main forces of our model do not change if the presence of rent-seeking politicians is combined with the government's ability to manipulate bond prices.
Politicians
There is a large number of potential and identical self-interested politicians who derive the following utility from economic activity:
x t represents ine¢ cient government projects only bene…cial to the politician in power which we refer to as rents. v (x t ) is increasing and weakly concave, and for simplicity, let v (x t ) = x t . 9 A politician who is out of power receives zero rents. The self-interested politician can be interpreted as an individual or a group of individuals who choose …scal policy. Like the benevolent ruler, the self-interested politician has the unique ability to improve household welfare by …nancing and providing public goods, but unlike the benevolent ruler, he derives no utility from this endeavor.
Markets
Household wages are normalized to 1 and are taxed at a linear rate t . b h t (s t+1 ) R 0 represents debt owned by the household at t, which is a promise to repay 1 unit of consumption at t + 1 conditional on the realization of s t+1 , and q t (s t+1 ) is its price at t. We ignore bonds of longer maturity structure only for notational simplicity. At every t, the household's allocation
o must satisfy the household's dynamic budget constraint
subject to n t 0. 
subject to g t 0 and x t 0. The only di¤erence between these budget constraints and those of the standard economy is that the rent x t is included on the left hand side of (4). We discuss the implications of allowing for default in Section 6.
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The economy is closed, and bonds are in zero net supply:
which combined with (3) and (4) implies the aggregate resource constraint
For notational simplicity, we let b g t (s t+1 ) = b t (s t+1 ) for the remainder of the discussion. b 1 (s 0 ) is exogenous. The following debt limits rule out Ponzi schemes
Let b to be su¢ ciently low and b to be su¢ ciently high so that (7) does not bind. More speci…cally, b is the natural debt limit so that b = R max = (1 ) for R max which represents the maximal tax revenue which can ever be collected by the government (see Section 3.3).
Political Environment
As in the electoral accountability models of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) , citizens control politicians by potentially removing them from o¢ ce. Let P t+1 = f0; 1g represent the decision by citizens to remove the incumbent in period t with P t+1 = 0 representing replacement. The interaction between citizens and politicians is a game:
1. Nature chooses the state s t .
2. Citizens make the replacement decision P t+1 .
3. The incumbent politician chooses policies t .
4. Markets open and clear.
5. If P t+1 = 0, the incumbent politician is replaced.
The important feature of this game is that even though citizens make their economic decisions independently, they make their political decisions regarding the replacement of the politician jointly. Since citizens are identical, there is no con ‡ict of interest between them. These joint political decisions can be achieved by a variety of formal or informal procedures such as elections or protests. We simplify the discussion by assuming that the decision is taken by the same single representative citizen in every period.
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Politicians and citizens derive payo¤s associated with P t+1 . If P t+1 = 0, the incumbent receives zero rents and endures an exogenous cost p (1 ) = > 0 from t onward. p captures institutional constraints on politicians which vary across societies and are empirically important determinants of economic activity around the world.
12 In addition, if P t+1 = 0, citizens receive an exogenous bene…t c (1 ) > 0 at t. c parameterizes the social bene…t of political turnover which is related to the fact that, even though all candidate politicians are identical, citizens may derive non-pecuniary bene…ts from replacement. 13 Throughout the text, we will often consider the special case in which c is arbitrarily close to zero.
14 Our timing of events implies that an incumbent can choose policies prior to removal from power. If instead P t+1 is chosen after the choice of policies t , none of our results change with the exception that incentives for politicians and citizens are no longer provided contemporaneously after the realization of s t , and this a¤ects the exact characterization of policies. We prefer this timing since it facilitates the exposition of our results.
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Consider the incentives of politicians and citizens implied by this game. If citizens keep the incumbent in power, they cannot control his policies. If the incumbent limits 11 This is identical to the decision being made via majoritarian elections with sincere voting. 12 See Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004) for evidence supporting this view. An alternative interpretation is that p is negatively related to the non-pecuniary value of holding political power.
13 Such a parameter exists for instance in models of collective action. See Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2007) as an example.
14 Our main results do not change if c = 0 as long as in addition to Assumption 1, we rule out the equilibrium in which (s t ) = max 8s t . 15 Our timing delivers an exact S; s rule for taxes. Under the alternative timing, the worst punishment remains the same, and (s t ) is replaced by (s t ; s t 1 ) in (27) and g (s t ) is replaced by g (s t ; s t 1 ) in (28). Details available upon request.
rents and provides public goods, he cannot control citizens'future replacement decisions. In the following section, we investigate how reputational considerations can alleviate the double-sided commitment problem faced by citizens and politicians.
Sustainable Competitive Equilibria
In this section, we build on the work of Kehoe (1993a,1993b ) and we de…ne a sustainable competitive equilibrium. Individual households are anonymous and nonstrategic in their private market behavior, though the representative citizen is strategic in his replacement decision. The politician in power is strategic in his choice of policies, and he must ensure that the government's dynamic budget constraint is satis…ed given the anonymous market behavior of households. Using this de…nition, we characterize the entire set of sustainable competitive equilibria using the primal approach. This allows us to select the e¢ cient sustainable competitive equilibrium in Section 4. denote a sequence of such vectors. At every t, the representative citizen publicly makes the replacement decision P t+1 as a function of h 0 t together with a contingency plan for choosing P k+1 's for all possible h , and de…ne and f analogously. The strategies of the incumbent politician and the representative citizen induce public histories. Each of ; ; f; and has a continuation at a given public history. In every period, the anonymous household's problem is to choose a continuation of f to maximize its welfare given continuations of ; ; and . The incumbent politician's problem is to choose a continuation of to maximize his welfare given continuations of ; f; and . The representative citizen's problem is to choose a continuation of which maximizes his welfare given continuations of ; f; and . must clear the bond market. In the Appendix, we describe each agent's problem formally, and we exclude this formalism from the text due to space restrictions.
De…nition
for R (n) = n n .
(8) is the resource constraint of the economy. R (n) is the revenue generated by labor n derived from the household's intratemporal condition. It is independent of consumption because of risk neutrality in consumption. (9) is the present value budget constraint of the government. It states that total public spending, rents, and initial government debt are serviced by total revenues. Present values are calculated using probabilities because of risk neutrality in consumption. Together with (8), (9) implies the satisfaction of the household's present value budget constraint. Because of the completeness of …nancial markets, the satisfaction of (8) and (9) are su¢ cient to imply the satisfaction of the government's present value budget constraint in the future:
for b (s t js t 1 ) representing a bond traded at s t 1 with payment conditional on s t .
Sustainable Competitive Equilibria
A competitive sequence and replacement rule P = fP (s t )g 1 t=0 need not be sustainable.
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For instance, in any given period, the incumbent politician can maximize his rents by choosing the revenue maximizing tax rate max associated with revenue R max and labor allocation n max .
18 Furthermore, he can set public spending to zero, repay the current debt b (s t js t 1 ), and borrow the maximal amount of debt b. Since the government is maximally indebted in the future, public spending and rents are zero forever. From (10), if the politician is thrown out of power in the next period, his continuation welfare is today is
Analogously, in any given period, the representative citizen can throw out the incumbent politician, and the exiting politician will maximize his current rents using the policies described above. Since public spending and rents are zero and taxes are maximal forever independently of replacement decisions, the representative citizen will throw out all future politicians and receive c forever. From (8) and (10), the representative citizen's continuation welfare today is
for
. These observations allow us to provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a sustainable competitive equilibrium using the methods developed by Abreu (1988) . Let V (f ; P g j s t ) and U (f ; P g j s t ) be the equilibrium continuation welfare to the incumbent politician and citizens, respectively, implied by f ; P g at a history s t .
Proposition 2 (Sustainable Competitive Equilibrium) f ; P g is a sustainable competitive equilibrium if and only if is competitive and f ; P g satis…es
8s t , and (11)
determined by (10) .
To understand (11) and (12) imagine the following punishment strategy. Whenever the incumbent politician or the representative citizen deviate from prescribed policies and replacement rules, the politician and the representative citizen revert to an equilibrium in which the incumbent is thrown out, taxes are maximal, public spending is zero, and debt is maximal forever. Conditions (11) and (12) guarantee that every deviation by the politician or representative citizen is weakly dominated. Note that equations (11) and (12) illustrate the endogenous debt limits generated by the presence of politicians. Government debt cannot be too low since this tightens the incentive compatibility constraint of the incumbent politician by providing him with more resources to potentially appropriate. Government debt cannot be too high, since this tightens the incentive compatibility constraint of the representative citizen by reducing the cost of throwing out the incumbent politician. Let represent is the set of sustainable competitive sequences f ; P g.
E¢ cient Sustainable Competitive Equilibria
Having characterized the entire set of sustainable competitive equilibria, we select the e¢ cient one so as to compare our economy to that under a benevolent ruler. To do this, we reduce the problem into one involving a single endogenous state variables which allows for a simple recursive representation of the problem (Section 4.2). We characterize the solution to this program using an example (Section 4.3). We consider short run dynamics (Section 4.4) and long run dynamics (Section 4.5). Finally, we relate our results to some of the previous literature (Section 4.6).
De…nition
De…nition 2 f ; P g 2 is an e¢ cient equilibrium if @ f 0 ; P 0 g 2 s.t.
Our de…nition ignores the welfare of candidate politicians and only considers the welfare of the incumbent politician in period 0. An e¢ cient equilibrium solves
In comparison, the original problem of Lucas and Stokey (1983) sets x (s t ) = 0 8s t and ignores constraints (11) and (12). For this reason, we will often consider the special case of V 0 = 0.
Assumption 1
The solution to (13) requires P (s t ) = 1 8s t .
In the Appendix, we provide a condition under which Assumption 1 is satis…ed. As an example, Assumption 1 is always satis…ed if c = 0, since there is little bene…t to the representative citizen from throwing out a politician and since it is optimal to keep the same politician in power forever so as to minimize the amount of rents required to induce his cooperation. If Assumption 1 were not satis…ed, then an incumbent politician facing replacement would choose the extractive policies described in Section 3.3. Thus, we are e¤ectively ignoring equilibria in which such policies are chosen.
1 t=0 and de…ne c; g; and x analogously.
Lemma 1 fn; gg solves (13) s.t. b 1 (s 0 ) = b and V (f ; P g j s 0 ) = V if and only if fn; gg
To understand Lemma 1, use (8) and (14) to rewrite (10), (11), and (12), respectively: 
Rewrite the period 0 welfare of households as
Lemma 1 is a consequence of the fact that the optimal fn; gg which maximizes (18) s.t. (15) (17) only depends on z 1 (s 0 ). Note that given this unique optimal sequence fn; gg, any sequence fc; xg which satis…es the resource constraint and (14) in period 0 is optimal. 20 The reason for this ‡exibility is that the politician is invested in the assets used to pay for his rents, and households are invested in the assets used to pay for their consumption. Consequently, it is possible to relax (11) by increasing rents (i.e., the value of cooperation) while holding debt constant or by increasing debt (i.e., the punishment from deviation) while holding rents constant. Because of risk neutrality, both of these methods are equivalent from a welfare perspective and have the same implications for the incentive compatible sequence of labor, public spending, and debt net of rents. Analogous arguments hold with respect to the relaxation of (12).
An implication of Lemma 1 is that (13) can be written recursively. Given (15) (18), and letting ks = Pr fs t+1 = kjs t = sg, we can write:
s.t.
J (s; z) represents the highest possible welfare to households-net of the stream of rents-that can be achieved conditional on the state s and on the value of debt net of rents being equal to z.
22 (19) represents this program written in a recursive fashion. n and g represent labor and public spending today, respectively. z k represents the value of debt net of rents conditional on the realization of the state k following state s. (20) ensures that the value of debt net of rents is z. (21) and (22) represent recursive versions of (16) and (17), respectively. We can characterize J (s; z).
Lemma 2 J (s; z) is de…ned over a compact interval [z s ; z s ], is strictly concave, and is continuously di¤erentiable in z 2 (z s ; z s ).
Remark 1 The Lucas and Stokey (1983) solution is a solution to (19) (20).
This problem adds two distortions to the original problem of Lucas and Stokey (1983) . First, the generation of rents can crowd out household consumption and increase taxes. Second, the constraints on z function like endogenous debt limits. Speci…cally, if z is interpreted as debt, then (19) (22) is isomorphic to an economy under a benevolent ruler facing ad-hoc debt limits.
Let , ks k , and ks k represent the Lagrange multipliers for (20), (21), and (22), respectively. First order conditions and the envelope condition yield: 22 The welfare of households in period 0 is J s 0 ; z 1 s
Equations (23) and (24) pin down output (and consequently the tax rate) and public spending, respectively, as a function of . By (26), higher z is associated with higher , higher taxes, and lower public spending. Equations (25) and (26) show that the slope of J ( ) only changes if an incentive compatibility constraint binds. For example, under a benevolent ruler, the slope of J ( ) never changes. De…ne
, the value of public spending normalized by its productivity.
Remark 2 The Lucas and Stokey (1983) 
Example
Before describing the general solution to our problem, we consider a simple example in which the economy experiences a deterministic one time increase in the productivity of public spending. This example is useful for understanding the dynamics of our model and its relationship to the benchmark model under a benevolent ruler. Figure 1 illustrates a deterministic economy experiencing a temporary one period increase in the productivity of public spending at date T for V 0 chosen arbitrarily low so that the solution e¤ectively only maximizes the welfare of households. We begin by considering the case in which p = 1 and c 0. This coincides with the economy under a benevolent ruler given that (21) and (22) never bind. Since it is optimal to smooth distortions from revenue generation, revenue is constant, and the government accumulates assets (negative debt) in preparation for the spending increase. During and after the spending increase, the government gradually depletes its assets in order to …nance its primary de…cit. With the exception of debt, nothing fundamentally changes about the economy before and after the spending increase. Now imagine a su¢ ciently large reduction in p , so that the politician's incentive constraint begins to bind along the equilibrium path. This constraint is the tightest at T when assets are at a maximum. To appease the politician, debt net of rents increases. Speci…cally, current and future rents can be increased, since this increases the politician's value of cooperation today and in the future. Moreover, current and future debt can be increased since this decreases the politician's value of deviation today and in the future. Both of these changes induce a persistent increase in the tax rate. If it were instead the case that taxes were constant throughout as in the economy under a benevolent government, the politician would be paid rents in period T and onward to dissuade him from appropriating assets accumulated at T . To see why this is ine¢ cient, note that the government could otherwise reduce taxes in periods prior to T in order to reduce the accumulated assets in period T , and it could reduce rents from period T onward to compensate for this reduction in revenue. This would leave debt net of rents from T onward unchanged, so that the incentive constraint of the politician is satis…ed. Furthermore, this would strictly increase the welfare of households by reducing rents and taxes. Therefore, the government saves less in order to pay lower rents to politicians. This causes the economy to fundamentally change after the spending increase since taxes are higher and public spending is lower after T in comparison to before T . Our discussion has ignored the incentives of the representative citizen. Imagine a su¢ ciently large increase in c so that the representative citizen's incentive constraint begins to bind along the equilibrium path. Consider the e¢ cient allocation which takes the politician's incentives into account but ignores the incentives of the representative citizen. The incentive constraint of the representative citizen is tight from T + 1 onward since taxes are higher and public spending is lower than in the periods which preceded T . In order to appease citizens into not removing the incumbent politician, current and future rents and debt can be decreased from T + 1 onward. These changes induce a persistent decrease in the tax rate. In contrast to the case which ignores the incentives of citizens, the increase in the tax rate in period T cannot be entirely smoothed into the future. Consequently, in period T , the tax rate increase is more severe in order to …nance the increased spending, and in period T + 1 it mean reverts, but it does not revert as far down as its original point prior to T , since the representative citizen is still willing to tolerate higher taxes and lower public spending relative to the periods which preceded T . 
Equilibrium Dynamics
The above example in a deterministic economy is useful for interpreting e¢ cient policies under a general stochastic economy experiencing Markovian shocks. These are characterized by S; s rules.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Policy Dynamics) The unique and g which solve (13) have the following property:
23 If instead the economy experienced a one time decrease in the productivity of public spending, analogous reasoning would hold for a persistent decrease in taxes.
(27) and (28) are dynamic equations which characterize the time path of the tax rate and public spending. The tax rate cannot be below a state dependent lower bound (s t ) and public spending cannot be above a state dependent upper bound e g (s t ). This ensures that the incentive compatibility constraint of the politician is satis…ed at s t .
Furthermore, the tax rate cannot be above a state dependent upper bound (s t ) and public spending cannot be below a state dependent lower bound e g (s t ). This ensures that the incentive compatibility constraint of the representative citizen is satis…ed at s t . These bounds are not a function of initial conditions, though the levels of (s 0 ) and e g (s 0 ) are determined by the initial condition z 1 (s 0 ) which depends on b 1 (s 0 )
and V 0 . Changes in the tax rate and in public spending are always smoothed into the future to the extent that such smoothing is possible given future incentive compatibility constraints. In addition to reducing economic distortions, this smoothing relaxes future incentive compatibility constraints through the implied change in debt net of rents. Debt net of rents is always within state dependent bounds associated with the S; s bounds for taxes and public spending:
Given (27) and (28), we can describe the relationship between our environment and that of a benevolent ruler. Note that if p is su¢ ciently high, the cost to politicians of being thrown out of power is high so that the lower bound on taxes and the upper bound on public spending never bind. Furthermore, if c is su¢ ciently low, the bene…t of replacing incumbents is low, so that the upper bound on taxes and the lower bound on public spending also never bind.
Corollary 1 If p = 1 and c 0, then the unique and g which solve (13) have the following property:
and e g s t = e g s t 1 8s t :
, then the solution will exactly coincide with that under a benevolent ruler of Lucas and Stokey (1983) . In contrast, if p is low, then the incentive compatibility constraint on the politician occasionally binds, and if c is high, then the incentive compatibility constraint on the representative citizen occasionally binds. By the same reasoning as in the example of Section 4.3, it is ine¢ cient in such circumstance to maintain a …xed tax rate. More generally, the tax rate re ‡ects the last binding incentive compatibility constraint, since shocks to the productivity of public spending create variation in the tightness of incentive constraints, and taxes respond persistently to these shocks. This theorem establishes that there are initial conditions under which the tax rate experiences persistent changes after an incentive compatibility constraint binds. For example, imagine if p is low so that the politician's incentive compatibility constraint binds and choose V 0 arbitrarily low so that the program e¤ectively maximizes the welfare of households. Choose the initial state s 0 such that the benevolent ruler normally saves in anticipation of a high shock. In an economy which considers the incentives of the politician, the government will not accumulate savings to be pledged for the increase in spending, and instead, the increase in spending will be met with a persistent increase in the tax rate to accommodate the politician's incentives.
In the deterministic example of Section 4.3, the lower bound on taxes is higher when public spending is more productive (the politician requires incentives), and the upper bound on taxes is lower when public spending is less productive (the representative citizen requires incentives). In a stochastic economy, this is generally true under i.i.d. shocks.
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Proposition 4 (i.i.d. Tax Intervals) If ks = k 8k; s 2 S, then (s) < (k) and
This means that under i.i.d. shocks, the tax rate weakly increases if increases, and it weakly decreases if decreases. Therefore, the tax rate is more likely to change tomorrow if tomorrow signi…cantly di¤ers from today.
Long Run Dynamics
The example of Section 4.3 shows that if we ignore the incentive compatibility constraint of the representative citizen, taxes permanently adjusts following a one time shock. Analogous reasoning implies that if we ignore the incentive compatibility constraint of the politician, the tax rate also permanently adjusts following a one time shock. We use this observation to explore the long run properties of the tax rate. By Proposition 3, the tax rate converges if the sustainable intervals for the tax rate have an overlapping region. A tax rate in this region satis…es all incentive compatibility constraints under all states. Incentive provision for the politician puts upward pressure on the tax rate under some shocks and incentive provision for the representative citizen puts downward pressure on the tax rate under some shocks. When there is su¢ ciently little bene…t to the representative citizen from throwing out the politician, the representative citizen will tolerate very high tax rates. Analogously, when there is su¢ ciently little bene…t to the politician from additional rent-seeking, he will tolerate low tax rates. For example, imagine if c is low.
Along the equilibrium path, the government accumulates debt and rents to accommodate the politician's incentives, and the representative citizen receives su¢ ciently little bene…t from throwing out the incumbent so that he accepts the gradual increase in the tax rate and decrease in public spending which accompany the government's accumulation of debt and rents. In the long run, this economy is qualitatively similar to an economy managed by a benevolent ruler but with more debt net of rents than that associated with a benevolent ruler. The long run behavior of this economy stands in contrast to that of Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2002) . They show that in an economy without state-contingent debt, taxes respond persistently to shocks along the equilibrium path, as they do here. However, the benevolent ruler accumulates assets along the equilibrium path, until he can …nance the entire stream of public spending with zero taxes. If the tax intervals do not overlap, then a …xed tax rate cannot satisfy all incentive compatibility constraints. Given the updating rule in (27), this means that the tax rate is volatile and potentially history dependent even in the long run.
25 If the cost of being thrown out of power is not su¢ ciently large to the politician and if the bene…t of throwing a politician out of power is too high for citizens, then a …xed tax rate cannot satisfy all incentive compatibility constraints. Intuitively, citizens may tolerate a high tax rate when the government is very productive, but when the government ceases to be productive, they require a decrease in the tax rate. This decrease in the tax rate is nevertheless not sustainable if the government becomes productive again in the future, since the politician's incentive compatibility constraint will bind. Therefore, even in the long run, this economy will di¤er from that of a benevolent ruler.
Predicting Tax Rate Movements
Our model predicts that tax rates should sometimes adjust persistently to shocks, and this is in line with what we observe empirically. As mentioned in the introduction, both Barro (1979) and Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2002) also predict persistent tax rates, and they achieve this by ruling out state-contingent debt. A natural question is how the stochastic process of tax rates in our economy compares to theirs.
To simplify the discussion, let the shock map one to one with the state s. According to Lucas and Stokey (1983) , the tax rate covaries one to one with (in the quasi-linear model, the covariance is zero), which means that tax rates tomorrow are best predicted by today's shock used to forecast tomorrow's shock: E ( t j t 1 ; :::; 0 ; t 1 ; :::; 0 ) = E ( t j t 1 ) .
In contrast, according to Barro (1979) 's intuitions, taxes are a random walk, which means that yesterday's tax rate alone can predict today's tax rate: E ( t j t 1 ; :::; 0 ; t 1 ; :::; 0 ) = E ( t j t 1 ) .
Our model combines features of both of these statistical processes. Given (27), both past tax rates and past shocks are required to forecast tomorrow's tax rate: E ( t j t 1 ; :::; 0 ; t 1 ; :::; 0 ) = E ( t j t 1 ; t 1 ) . This statistical process for the tax rate in our model is qualitatively similar to that of Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2002) , even though there are no exogenous limits on the contingency of government debt in our model. The crucial distinction between our model and theirs is in the long run implications for the tax rate. In their model, the tax rate converges to zero and the government holds more assets in the long run than would be implied under a benevolent ruler with complete markets. In our model, the tax rate may not converge, and if it converges, it will not normally converge to zero. For instance, if p is su¢ ciently low that positive rents are paid to the politician, but c is su¢ ciently low so that incentives are not necessary for citizens, the tax rate converges to a positive level and the government holds more debt net of rents in the long run than would be implied under a benevolent ruler. Our model therefore links the existence of politicians to the endogenous incompleteness of markets, and it provides di¤erent implications than an economy with exogenous market incompleteness.
Numerical Example
Our model suggests that conventional policy prescriptions which recommend …xed taxes are ine¢ cient because they induce excessive rent-seeking. In this section, we illustrate the mechanics of our model using a numerical simulation, and we describe the various sources of ine¢ ciencies induced by political economy as well as ine¢ ciencies which arise under suboptimal policies appropriate to a benevolent planner. Let ( ; ; ; b 0 ; V 0 ) = (:75; 2; :5; 0; 0) , = :95, and t = f4; 5; 6g .
Normalize the resource constraint to c + g + x = 10n. The transition matrix for is so that each shock is very persistent, and a path between the highest to the lowest shock must pass through the middle shock. Let 0 = 4. We compare three cases:
Case 1: Case 2: Case 3:
As a reminder, case 1 corresponds to the economy under a benevolent ruler, since the incentive compatibility constraint on neither the politician nor the representative citizen binds. Case 2 ignores the incentive compatibility constraint of the representative citizen, and case 3 takes the incentive compatibility constraint of the representative citizen into account. In cases 2 and 3, the size of p is chosen such that a deviation in period zero yields R max to the politician o¤ the equilibrium path. In case 3, c is chosen such that the representative citizen's constraint binds in the low state only. Figure 2 compares cases 1 and 2 for a realized sequence of shocks. In case 1, rents are zero, public spending and government debt vary only with the state, and taxes and output are constant. These policies are not incentive compatible in case 2 since they violate (16). Speci…cally, the increase in assets when increases is not incentive compatible since the politician prefers to use these assets personally. Therefore, debt net of rents cannot decrease whenever increases. This permanently increases the tax rate which permanently decreases output. Since c = 0, the representative citizen's incentive compatibility constraint never binds. Along the equilibrium path, policies re ‡ect the last binding incentive compatibility constraint on the politician, until the tax rate reaches a maximum and the economy becomes qualitatively the same as in case 1. incentive compatibility constraint binds in the lowest state in a transition path from the high state to the low state. In the low state, the government is less productive, and citizens need incentives to not throw out the politician, so that the tax rate decreases. As a consequence, the tax rate in the middle state depends on whether the highest or the lowest state occurred most recently. This means that even in the long run, the tax rate and output continue to be volatile and continue to re ‡ect the history of shocks. In Figures 4, we compare the long run properties of our economy in case 3 to that of Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2002) for which state contingent debt is not available. While the tax rate exhibits persistence in their economy along the equilibrium path as in ours, the government accumulates enough assets so that the tax rate converges to zero and output and public spending converge to the …rst best level in the long run. In our economy, such a large asset position is economically unnecessary given complete markets, and it is politically unsustainable given the incentives of politicians.
In the …rst column of Table 1 , we compare the welfare of households in di¤erent economies to determine the welfare cost due to politicians. 26 We calculate the fraction of consumption which would be sacri…ced in the economy of case 1 to make a household indifferent between living in case 1 (i.e., under a benevolent ruler with complete markets) and living in a given economy. As two benchmarks, we calculate the welfare cost of balanced budget restrictions and non-contingent debt restrictions for the benevolent government. This table suggests that the cost of due to politicians in cases 2 and 3 is low in absolute terms, though it is higher than the cost of running a balanced budget or of not using contingent debt. Our result is not so surprising given that rents in both cases are low in equilibrium (e.g., they represent 1.6% of consumption in case 1). 27 Therefore, distortions in addition to the rent transfers to the politician are due to the endogenous constraints on …nancial markets, and these distortions are not very large for similar reasons that exogenous constraints on …nancial markets are not very distortive. We also calculate the cost of choosing suboptimal policies appropriate to the benevolent ruler in our environment. We consider the solution to (13) subject to (s t ) = (s t 1 ) 8s t and e g (s t ) = e g (s t 1 ) 8s t , taking into account that additional rents may be generated from this exercise. The cost of this suboptimal sustainable policy is very high. The other columns of Table 2 explains why. They depict long run average taxes, public spending, and rents in di¤erent economies. 29 It shows that under the suboptimal sustainable policy, the government collects less revenue, provides fewer public goods, and wastes more resources on rents than in the best sustainable policy. This is because the politician cannot be trusted to pledge accumulated revenues for public use, and this simultaneously limits the size of the government while making the government more wasteful. Our exercise suggests 27 For high enough p , rents are zero and the tax rate can continue to be persistent. 28 See Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2002) , for example. 29 Given the multiplicity of optimal sequences of x, we consider the solution with constant rents to get a meaningful number for x AV G . that a potential reason that a benevolent ruler's policies are not observed in practice is that these polices are very ine¢ cient once the incentives of politicians are considered. Our analysis thus far has ignored an important friction which could realistically interact with politicians'rent-seeking incentives: politicians can default on outstanding debt. In this section, we explore the e¤ect of allowing for default, and we highlight how our main results are insensitive to allowing for this possibility. We provide a sketch of the main intuitions due to space constraints. Imagine if in addition to its policy choices, the government chooses an indicator D t = f0; 1g which represents a decision to default on outstanding debt. Moreover, for simplicity, let us set c = 0, and since citizens' incentives can be ignored, let us allow citizens to throw a politician out at the end of the period. In such a setting, one can de…ne sustainable competitive equilibria, as we do in Section 2, and an important implication of this de…nition is that, in their savings decisions, households will take into account their expectations of future default. This is important in characterizing the optimal deviation and well as the optimal punishment for the politician. It is obvious that a politician's best deviation will involve defaulting on outstanding debt in addition to choosing maximal taxes and minimal public spending. More subtle however is that if the politician attempts to extract the maximal amount of debt b, the optimal punishment strategy will involve households expecting default by future governments, and this induces a market clearing price of zero for this debt. Consequently, the politician's best deviation yields:
which implies that the politician's incentive compatibility constraint is equivalent to the following two constraints for z (s t js t 1 ) de…ned in Section 4.2:
Note that (30) is analogous to (16), though the constraints on the values of z (s t js t 1 ) are now weaker so that the possibility of default is actually allowing the government to be less constrained in its savings. The additional constraint of (31) puts discipline on incentive compatible sequences of x which can be chosen for a given unique optimal sequence of n and g, and such a constraint can be easily satis…ed by choosing a constant level of rents. Consequently, our analysis of the case without default can be applied to this case with default, and the time path of taxes and public spending is characterized by (27) and (28).
The reason why the possibility of default does not a¤ect our results is that our results are driven in large part by the fact that large government asset positions are costly since they are associated with high rents. This fact is una¤ected by the government's ability to renege on its debt.
Risk Averse Preferences
An additional friction which our analysis has ignored is the manner by which the interest rate manipulation motive interacts with the rent-seeking motive of politicians. By choosing income taxes in a closed economy, a government implicitly choose state prices, and an inability to commit to taxes implies an inability commit to a rate of interest. Such an inability to commit may be a problem even for a benevolent government if there are limits on the number of maturities available. 30 In this section, we brie ‡y consider the e¤ect of allowing for risk aversion, and we present some analysis which suggests that our main results hold even if politicians can manipulate interest rates. We circumvent many complications associated with the introduction of risk aversion by considering the economy of the previous section with default, by limiting the …nancial environment to one period bonds, and by considering a set of preferences under which the policies of the benevolent government can be explicitly characterized so as to compare 30 See for example Krusell, Martin, and Rios-Rull (2005). them to those of the rent-seeking politicians:
for v ( ) which is increasing, strictly concave, and bounded from below, with v 0 (0) = 1.
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In this framework, the entire set of sustainable competitive equilibria can be characterized as in Section 3, with conditions analogous to (8), (9), (10), and (11). This is performed in the Appendix. The e¢ cient sustainable competitive equilibrium can be de…ned as in (13). For simplicity, we assume that b 1 (s 0 ) = 0.
Remark 3 The Lucas and Stokey (1983) 
The advantage of (32) is that the solution under a benevolent ruler which ignores incentive compatibility constraints is analytically tractable as in the quasi-linear economy.
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Moreover, starting from b 1 (s 0 ) = 0 and (s 0 ) < max s (s), the benevolent ruler saves in early periods in anticipation of increased public spending in the future. Furthermore, the worst punishment for the politician is decreasing in government debt b (s t js t 1 ) as in our quasi-linear economy. This implies an analogous result to Theorem 1. The intuition for this result is as follows. Imagine if V 0 is arbitrarily low so that only the welfare of households is considered. Furthermore, imagine if (s 0 ) is low so that the benevolent ruler saves to pay for the increase in public spending in the future. When spending increases in the future, household consumption is crowded out, and labor is increased to accommodate the change. Now imagine if the solution to the problem which takes into account the incentives of politicians took the same form. In addition to consumption, rents would be crowded out during the spending increase since the resource constraint is tighter. However, it is exactly when these rents are crowded out that the incentive for the politician to deviate is the greatest since the government holds many assets. Therefore, under a …xed tax rate, the politician receives an excessive amount of rents under the low shock to compensate for this. A more optimal policy is to reduce the amount of savings as well as the amount of rents in periods prior to the high shock and to respond to the high shock with a persistent increase in the tax rate. 31 In principle, we could numerically compute the equilibrium in a more general environment using the methods of Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) . We leave this to future research.
32 See Werning (2006b) for other examples of utility functions with tractable solutions.
In conclusion, our analysis of this section suggests that our results are robust to allowing for interest rate manipulation by politicians. Even if politicians can manipulate the interest rate, it continues to be ine¢ cient for the government to smooth taxes by raising as many assets, and instead, it is more e¢ cient for the government to save less and push taxes into the future so as to reduce rent-seeking, and this implies tax rates which respond persistently to shocks.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a theoretical framework which studies the optimal management of taxes and debt in an environment with self-interested politicians and citizens. In doing this, we have argued that incentive compatibility for the incumbent politician and the representative citizen takes the form of endogenous debt limits on the government, and this creates distortions which generate more macroeconomic persistence and volatility than under a benevolent ruler. Our model predicts that taxes respond persistently to shocks even though …nancial markets are complete, and long run taxes are non-zero, which is in contrast to an economy with exogenously incomplete …nancial markets. Our numerical simulations provide us with a lesson. The cost arising from the self-interest of politicians may not be very high if the government chooses optimal sustainable taxes which respond persistently to shocks. Nevertheless, suboptimal sustainable taxes which resemble those under a benevolent ruler are very costly. This suggests that it is important to understand the constraints on politicians before making policy prescriptions.
Our analysis leaves some natural directions for future research. We have assumed the perfect observability of the politician's actions, although in practice rent-seeking is a private activity. Relaxing this assumption would generate even further distortions in our economy and provide more limits on …nancial markets. It would also potentially generate endogenous political replacement and a political business cycles. Second, our model ignores the important interaction between …scal policy and monetary policy by focusing on the real economy. We plan to explore these extensions in future research.
Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1. A sustainable competitive equilibrium must be competitive so as to satisfy (8) and (9).
Step 2. For the necessity of (11), the politician at history s t can choose a deviation to (33), (34), and the de…nition of b. Since g 0 s k 0 and
Since p > 0, the lowest welfare to the politician after the deviation is V (b (s t js t 1 )).
Step 3. For the necessity of (12), the representative citizen can throw out the current incumbent. Following this decision, the current incumbent's best response sets x 0 (s t ) =
) with the same policies as in step 2. No other response can dominate this response since by (10) and the de…nition of R max and b,
The best response of all future representative citizens is to throw out future incumbents. By (8) and (10), the representative citizen receives U (b (s t js t 1 )) after the deviation.
Step 4. For the su¢ ciency of (11) and (12), consider the following equilibrium. Any deviation by the incumbent at s t results in the representative citizen throwing out the incumbent at s t+1 as in step 3. Any deviation by the representative citizen at s t results in the incumbent choosing extractive policies as in step 2. Given this punishment, the best deviation by the incumbent at s t yields the right hand side of (11). This is because the politician's welfare from rents under the best deviation x 0 (s
cannot exceed the right hand side of (36), and the right hand side of (36) can be achieved with the same policies as described in step 2. By (11), this deviation is weakly dominated. If the representative citizen deviates by throwing out the current incumbent at s t , then he achieves the right hand side of (12) by step 3, but this deviation is weakly dominated by (12). Q.E.D.
Su¢ cient Condition for Assumption 1
Consider the following two conditions.
1. V 0 0, and
We can show that these two conditions imply Assumption 1.
Step 1. Condition 2 implies that P (s
otherwise by steps 2 and 3 of the proof of Proposition 2. Condition 2 implies that
Step 2. Imagine if the solution admits P s T = 0 for some s T in which the incumbent in period 0 is thrown out under an optimal sequence . Let 0 be identical to with the exception that
which is an indicator which equals 1 if the incumbent in period 0 holds power at t. Also, let x 0 (s t ) = 0 if I 0 (s t ) = 1 and s t 6 = s T , and let c 0 (
It can be veri…ed that 0 2 and the perturbation leaves both agents as well o¤.
Step 3. Given the perturbation of step 2, incentive compatibility for the politician in period 0 and the fact that V 0 0 implies that
From steps 2 and 3 from the proof of Proposition 2 and from (10),
. However, by condition 2 and step 1, 9 00 2 which is identical to 0 but which di¤ers from s T onward under which V (f 00 ; P g j
and U (f 00 ; P g j s T ) > U b 0 s T js T 1 . Therefore, 00 yields strictly higher welfare for the politician and the households relative to . Therefore, P (s t ) = 0 8s t under the optimal sequence.
Proofs of Section 4
8.4.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Step 1. Consider the original solution and perform the same substitutions as in the text.
Step 2. Consider the solution s.t. b 1 (s 0 ) = b + V and V (f ; P g j s 0 ) = 0 and imagine if fn; gg does not attain the optimum but fn 0 ; g 0 g 6 = fn; gg attains it. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Step 1. The solution to (13) sets n (s t ) n max 8s t . If this is not the case, then 9 0 2 identical to with the exception that n 0 (s
and x 0 (s t ) = x (s t ) for all such s t . This perturbation strictly increases the welfare of the households and leaves the politician as well o¤.
Step 2. De…ne the sequence program implied by (19) (22) for a given z 1 (s 0 ) in terms of fR; gg so that the instantaneous utility to the household becomes e u (R) g + g for e u (R) = n n s.t. R (n) = R. e u 00 (R) < 0 by the implicit function theorem given step 1.
Step 3. Let z s be the set of feasible values of z for our program given s. If z 0 ; z 00 2 z s , then z = z 0 + (1 ) z 00 2 z s 8 2 (0; 1) since fR ; g g = fR 0 ; g 0 g + (1 ) fR 00 ; g 00 g is feasible and satis…es all constraints. Moreover, fR ; g g yields strictly greater welfare than J (s; z 0 ) + (1 ) J (s; z 00 ), establishing concavity.
Step 4. Step 5. Consider a sequence fR; gg associated with the solution for some z 2 (z s ; z s ). Consider the sequence fR ; g g for which the only di¤erence between fR; gg and fR ; g g is that R 0 = R 0 + for R 0 arbitrarily low. Since e u 0 (R max ) = 1, R 0 < R max if z 2 (z s ; z s ). De…ne F (s; z; ) = e u (R 0 ) g 0 + (s) g 0 + P ks J (k; J k ), so that F (s; b; 0) = J (s; b). Optimality implies that F (s; b; ) J (s; b + ) for F (s; b; ) which is concave and di¤erentiable. By Lemma 1 of Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) J ( ) is di¤erentiable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1. By (23), (26), and step 1 of the proof of Lemma 2, J z (s; z) = 1 n 1 = n 1 1 1= , which implies that J (s; z) z is decreasing in z.
Step 2. De…ne (s) = J z (s; R max = (1 ) p ) and de…ne (s) = J z (s; z) for z which solves J (s; z) z = U AU T + c .
Step 3. Suppose that (s t 1 ) < (s t ). Then by the concavity of J ( ), for (21) to hold, we require (s t ) (s t ) > (s t 1 ), so that from equation (25), (s t ) > 0. This implies that z (s t js t 1 ) = R max = (1 ) p and therefore (s t ) = (s t ). Analogous arguments hold for (s t 1 ) > (s t ).
Step 4. Suppose that (s t 1 ) 2 (s t ) ; (s t ) . If (s t ) > 0, we have z (s t js t 1 ) = R max = (1 ) p and consequently (s t ) = (s t ). But from (25), (s t ) > 0 implies that (s t ) > (s t 1 ) which is a contradiction. Therefore, (s t ) = 0. Analogous arguments hold if (s t ) > 0.
Step 5. Therefore
which implies (27) and (28) from (23), (24), and (33). Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
Step 1. The solution to the problem which ignores (21) and (22) for z 1 (s 0 ) = b 1 (s 0 ) + max f0; V 0 g.
Step 2. Choose p su¢ ciently large and c su¢ ciently small that (21) and (22) do not bind under the implied allocation of step 1. This is possible since z 1 (s 0 ) < b, which is guaranteed by Assumption 1, since otherwise the politician is thrown out of o¢ ce in period 0 for any value of c . Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1
Step 1. Choose V 0 = 0 and choose s 0 = arg min s (s). Choose p su¢ ciently low so that Step 2. Since (k; ) < (s; ) if (s) < (k) then necessarily (s 1 ) > (s 0 ) and (s 1 ) > (s 0 ) for some s 1 in order that (21) be satis…ed for such s 1 .
Step 3. Consider a path s 0 ; s 1 ; s 0 for s 1 for which (s 1 ) > (s 0 ). From (27), (s 2 ) = min f (s 1 ) ; (s 0 )g > (s 0 ) = (s 0 ), where we have used Assumption 1 and the de…nition of (s 0 ) in Proposition 3 to establish (s 0 ) > (s 0 ).
Step 4. Choose V 0 su¢ ciently large that z 1 (s 0 ) = z (s 0 ) for z (s 0 ) associated with (s 0 ) and choose s 0 = arg max s (s). Analogous arguments to steps 1-3 imply that for c su¢ ciently high, there exists a path s 0 ; s 1 ; s 0 with taxes (s 0 ), (s 1 ), max f (s 1 ) ; (s 0 )g < (s 0 ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Step 1. Given (38) and the i.i.d. assumption, E f k js t ; t g for k > t is independent of s t and is weakly increasing in t .
Step 2. E P 1 k=t+1 k t k js t ; t weakly increases in t and E P 1 k=t+1 k t W k js t ; t weakly decreases in t ; and both are independent of s t .
Step 3. If (s t ) is increasing in s t , then E P 1 k=t k t k js t ; t strictly decreases in s t conditional on t and E P 1 k=t k t W k js t ; t strictly increases in s t conditional on t .
Step 4. By the de…nitions of (s t ) and (s t ), these solve 
Step 5. Choose V 0 = 0 and p su¢ ciently low that (43) binds in period 0. From (44) and (45), in order that (s t ) = (s t 1 ) 8s t , it must be that (s t ) = 0 8t > 0.
Choose s 0 = arg min s (s). By p (1 ) = from k 1 onward, which given risk neutrality is equivalent a cost of p (1 ) = 2 from k onward.
